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Abstract 
Environmental voluntary agreements with industries are becoming a popular alternative to traditional 
regulation. One reason may be that such agreements increase implementation cost efficiency. On the 
other hand, models of the political economy of environmental voluntary agreements point out that effi-
ciency reducing agreements are also possible under certain conditions. 
In this paper we interpret empirical evidence from case studies of environmental voluntary agreements 
using one such policy formulation and implementation model. When our sample is interpreted in this light 
the data suggests that environmental voluntary agreements may often be chosen in order to shift the re-
sponsibility for implementation to industrial organizations that are less sensitive to criticism from power-
ful environmental interest groups. When this explanation of an environmental voluntary agreement ap-
plies, the model predicts that the agreement will be less cost effective and achieve lower environmental 
performance than the traditional regulatory alternative which would otherwise have been adopted. 
Although our findings are not conclusive nor necessarily representative they do suggest the worrying 
possibility that many of the environmental voluntary agreements being established today achieve lower 
environmental performance less cost effectively than the most likely traditional regulatory alternative.  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Evaluation of policy instrument efficiency is traditionally done by comparing differ-
ent policy instruments for achieving a given set of policy goals with respect to first 
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and foremost static efficiency, but also dynamic and administrative efficiency. Such 
evaluations essentially assume a dichotomy between the political process of 
goal setting and that of policy instrument choice. Given this dichotomy the policy 
instrument evaluation is robust to imperfections in the political process. Achieving 
given goals in a least cost way is always welfare improving so that for the problem 
of instrument choice the instrument evaluation retains its relevance even though 
policy goals may be set imperfectly.  
For voluntary agreements with industrial organizations, on the other hand, macro 
policy goals are subject to negotiations between authorities and the regulated indus-
try and so the assumption of dichotomy must be rejected. When the assumption of 
dichotomy is rejected, a meaningful comparison of voluntary agreements with tradi-
tional approaches must also include an evaluation of the relative 'efficiency' of the 
underlying political goal setting processes. Policy process efficiency is a new di-
mension that broadens the usual notion of policy efficiency and should ideally take 
into account changes in policy process imperfections (e.g. agency capture) as well as 
transaction costs of the policy formulation process. 
In this paper we focus solely on the political economy of voluntary agreements 
with industrial organizations. The goal of the paper is to confront the policy formu-
lation and implementation model originally presented in Hansen (1999) with empiri-
cal evidence collected from a number of case studies of voluntary agreements 
through a meta study. 
In the next section characteristics distinguishing policy formulation through vol-
untary agreements from the traditional policy formulation process are discussed and 
in sections 3 to 5 the theoretical model is presented and predictions from the model 
deduced.  This model is a revised version of Hansen (1999) focussing on the particu-
lar specification of the model that is relevant for the selection of voluntary agree-
ments studied here. In section 6 the meta study is described and the theoretical pre-
dictions confronted with the meta study results. Finally, in section 7 conclusions are 
drawn.    
2. CHARACTERISTICS DISTINGUISHING POLICY FORMULATION 
THROUGH VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT FROM THE TRADITIONAL POLICY 
FORMULATION PROCESS  
In the following I describe the traditional policy process and the voluntary agree-
ment process based on empirical surveys (e.g. IEA (1995), Glachant (1994)) and 
point to some key differences. 
The traditional process consists of legislation on regulatory instruments where 
implementation and administration of these instruments are delegated to a regulatory 
agency. While energy and environmental policy goals may be contested and subject 
to negotiation, the real battle is over legislation on regulatory instruments. This usu-
ally requires a legislative process with direct participation of the executive branch of 
Government (hereafter just called Government) and the legislative bodies of Gov-
ernment (hereafter called Congress). Affected industrial organizations and other 
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interest groups may indirectly influence the process through quiet lobbying or by 
participating in the public debate on policy.  
Voluntary agreements (VAs) normally only have Government agencies and indi-
vidual firms or industrial organizations (IOs) as direct participants. Normally, 
agreements do not result in legislation. The IOs commit to targets and monitoring 
procedures, but not necessarily to specific instruments or methods of implementa-
tion. Normally, no formal sanctions for non-attention of targets are specified. 
One apparent difference between the two policy formulation processes is that 
Congress participates directly in the traditional process, but is excluded from direct 
participation in the voluntary process. Instead IOs are elevated to a role as direct 
participants. Clearly, environmental interest groups (EGs) and Congress may still 
indirectly influence the voluntary policy process. 
When considering voluntary agreements with industrial organizations another 
novelty is that implementation of environmental goals or agreed-on instruments is 
left to the industrial organizations rather than to public agencies. This can be seen as 
a necessary consequence of not involving Congress directly since implementation by 
traditional regulatory instruments through Government agencies would normally 
require passing of legislation. Though regulatory agencies may still have a monitor-
ing role, Governments must contract with industrial organizations for implementa-
tion. Thus the responsibility for and practical implementation of regulatory instru-
ments are shifted to industrial organizations. The reward to IOs for implementing 
environmental targets is usually implicit in the agreement. One possibility is that 
Government promises not to push for traditional regulation if targets are met. 
Though IOs may be able to implement effective regulatory instruments vis-à-vis 
member firms, the issue of credibility of Government threats/promises and IO -
compliance with the negotiated targets is relevant. 
Just as implementation through IOs is a consequence of excluding Congress 
from direct participation so is the voluntary agreement process what makes imple-
mentation through IOs possible. If IOs are to take responsibility for implementation, 
Government must of course negotiate an agreement with them. 
In conclusion voluntary agreements can be seen as a policy process with three cen-
tral characteristics distinguishing it from the traditional policy process: 
 
(i) Statutory sanctions ensuring IO participation and compliance are not 
possible under voluntary agreements. Instead IOs must be induced to 
comply through e.g. threats of new regulation in the area covered by 
the agreement. The question of what government can credibly threaten 
to do arises.  
(ii) Congress is no longer a direct participant in the policy formulation 
process - instead IOs become direct participants. 
(iii) IOs share responsibility for setting goals, and responsibility for imple-
mentation of regulation is shifted to industrial organizations. 
 
It seems that a credible threat (i) supporting a voluntary agreement would be the 
expected result if the traditional policy process was undertaken. We might then ex-
pect that VAs must result in situations where both parties of the agreement (Gov-
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ernment and the IO) expect to be at least as well off as under the traditional policy 
formulation process - otherwise they would not have an incentive to enter into the 
agreement. Since we cannot expect a VA to achieve more than what the regulator 
otherwise would have been able to achieve through a traditional regulatory process, 
one might ask why we see so many VAs. 
One explanation might be that shifting implementation responsibility to IOs in-
creases efficiency (i.e. reduces the cost of achieving a given environmental goal) 
thus giving room for both parties to the agreement to become better off. Let us call 
this the efficiency explanation. However, other explanations may also be possible. 
The less direct influence of Congress on the VA-process (ii) may in itself be a 
reason for entering into an agreement. If Government and opposition parties disa-
gree on policy priorities and the traditional policy process necessitates compromises 
with opposition parties, it may be that compromising with the IO through a VA can 
get Government a better deal. Let us call this the policy disagreement explanation. 
The shift of responsibility for goal setting and goal attainment to IOs (iii) may 
also be a driving force for undertaking VAs. If governments are sensitive to interest 
group criticism of policy goals and their possible non-attainment, it may be advanta-
geous to shift responsibility to IOs. Let us call this the responsibility shifting expla-
nation. 
The first explanation of why VAs are made, also implies that they are welfare in-
creasing. The last two explanations, however, open for the possibility that VAs may 
be entered into for other reasons than increased efficiency and thus might be welfare 
reducing. This makes it interesting to develop a theory of the VAs and to confront 
such a theory with empirical evidence. 
3. A SIMPLE MODEL 
The model has four active agents: the IO representing polluting firms, the envi-
ronmental interest group, the Government and the Congress. Government may initi-
ate the traditional policy formulation process through Congress or enter a voluntary 
agreement process with the IO. We assume that a voluntary agreement blocks initia-
tion of the traditional policy formulation process. When negotiating the agreement 
Government may try to induce the IO to accept terms that are more favourable to 
Government by threatening to push for traditional regulation in the event that no 
agreement made. We assume that Government threats of pushing for regulation, 
which does not maximise the utility of Government, are not credible. In other words 
the only credible threat that Government can make for the situation where no 
agreement is made is to maximize Government utility in connection with the tradi-
tional policy process. 
Initially we give a fairly detailed presentation of a simple model that captures the 
shift of direct influence away from Congress and towards the IO caused by the VA 
process (ii). Then we extend the model by introducing interest group criticism there-
by making shifting of responsibility (iii) potentially advantageous. 
Both policy formulation processes result in the setting of an environmental goal 
denoted R (indicating amount by which environmental damage is to be reduced) and 
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a tax revenue goal T (indicating the amount of revenue to be collected through regu-
latory instruments). Implementation of these goals through the available regulatory 
instruments (taxes, direct regulation or a combination) results in firm compliance 
costs denoted C in addition to the tax revenue payment. 
Let Uf denote the utility effect on firms of regulation and define: 
 f
 = -T - CU  
and assume that the firm IO's utility is equal to the effect of regulation on firms' 
profits. We assume that the environmental interest groups' utility is equal to regula-
tion effect on environmental damage (i.e. R). Government and Congress are both 
assumed to take into account the utility effects of regulation on firms, the environ-
mental interest group and the part of the public that might benefit from increased tax 
revenues. However, they may differ in the relative weights attached to these groups 
in their respective utility function. Let Uc and Ug denote the utility effects of regula-
tion on Congress and Government respectively and define: 
 c f c c =  + T + RU U    
 g f g g =  + T + RU U    
where λc   and λg are the utility weights attached to tax revenue by Congress and 
Government respectively, δc and δg are the utility weights attached to environmental 
damage reduction. The utility function can be interpreted as the first order approxi-
mation of the actual utility function and includes all key variables affected by regu-
lation.  
The negotiation process between Government and Congress under the traditional 
policy formulation process is not modelled explicitly. Instead the utility function of 
Congress should be interpreted as representing the result of this process incorporat-
ing the relative power of Government and opposition parties in Congress. If Gov-
ernment’s utility function parameters are equal to the parameters of Congress’ utility 
function, this implies agreement between Government and opposition parties or a 
large relative Governmental negotiation power while unequal parameters indicate 
disagreement and low Government party negotiation power in Congress. 
The traditional policy process sets goals that are implemented through traditional 
Government policy instruments. Let C(R, T) describe the resulting firm compliance 
costs when goals are implemented through the available regulatory instruments. 
Thus the traditional policy formulation process is assumed to be described by the 
following maximization problem: 
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the solution to which is denoted  R* and T* . 
Agent utilities with the traditional regulation process become: 
 
* * * *
f  = -  - C( , )U T R T  (1) 
 
* * * *
c f c c =  +   + U U T R   (2) 
 
* * * *
g f g g =  +   + U U T R   (3) 
In the voluntary agreement process goals R, T are set through negotiations between 
Government and the IO and then implemented by the IO. Thus the industrial organi-
zation representing firms is assumed to have a regulatory instrument vis-à-vis its 
members (moral suasion, codes of conduct etc) with which it can ensure attainment 
of the environmental goals. Clearly, public tax revenues are not generated 
(i.e.T = 0 ). Further it is assumed that the regulatory costs are described by the 
functions C (cR, T) where T = 0. Thus by assumptions the two regulatory cost func-
tions are identical, save for the cost parameter c and the constraint that T = 0 under 
IO implementation. This simplifies the following derivations while capturing the 
essential difference in relative efficiency through a single parameter c, indicating the 
relative cost of IO-implementation. 
Agent utilities under the voluntary agreement process become: 
 f
 = -C(cR, 0)U
 (4) 
 
cc f =  + RU U   (5) 
 
gg f =  + RU U   (6) 
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We assume that the IO as well as government can predict the result of the traditional 
policy process R*,T* . Given this, a necessary condition for a voluntary agreement is 
that both parties to the agreement experience a non-negative utility gain vis-à-vis the 
traditional policy process which both parties know is the alternative. In other words, 
a non-empty set of goals ( R ) must exist for which both the following individual 
rationality (IR) constraints are satisfied:  
 
IR-firm: 
 
** * *
ff  = -C(cR, 0)  -  - C( , ) = UT R TU   (7) 
IR-Government: 
 
* ** *
g f g g gg f =  + R   +  +  = U UT RU U     (8) 
The set of parameter combinations in the (δg, λg) space that for any given combina-
tion of parameters (δc , λc , c) allows a non-empty set of  ( R ) satisfying both IR 
constraints can be found and characterized. When a specific parameter combination 
(δg, λg) is a member of this set (hereafter called the VA-set) a voluntary agreement 
becomes possible. In Hansen (1999) the resulting voluntary agreement for each pa-
rameter combination (δg, λg) is found by assuming that the Nash bargaining solution 
results whenever a voluntary agreement is possible. 
Figure 1 presents a graphical illustration of the VA-set and resulting bargaining 
solutions (for details of the derivation see Hansen 1999). In figure 1 the VA-set for 
reduced efficiency (i.e. c>1) is reproduced with its associated interior isoquants in-
dicating the resulting R for the entire VA-set. 
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a. Revenue raising alternative b. Non-revenue raising alternative 
FIGURE 1 Illustration of the VA-set for a model without interest group signalling power 
The shaded areas of figure 1a is the VA-set, i.e. the (δg, λg) parameter points where 
the VA policy process is chosen. In the dark shaded area VAs will result in lower 
environmental goals than under traditional regulation and in the light shaded area the 
resulting VAs will have higher environmental goals. As VA implementation costs 
rise (c increases) the VA-set is shifted down in the figure and when c>1 parameter 
values ( g c =   , g c =   ) are not included in the set. 
The intuition is that when the cost of implementing a given goal is higher under a 
VA than under traditional regulation (i.e. c>1) this extra cost reduces both firm and 
government utility and must therefore be balanced off by some other benefit if the 
VA is to be chosen. If government agrees with the policy priorities that result from 
the traditional policy process, a cost increasing VA will not be chosen because gov-
ernment does not gain anything from avoiding the process of compromising with 
opposition parties. However, VAs that increase implementation costs may be attrac-
tive to governments that disagree with the policy priorities that would result under 
the traditional policy process. If Government is less concerned with the environment 
and with raising tax revenue than Congress (i.e. g c <   and g c <   ) then VAs 
that lower environmental goals (and yield no tax revenue) may improve both Gov-
ernment and firm utility. Also if Government is more concerned with the environ-
ment than Congress ( g c >    ) VAs are also possible as long as Government is 
sufficiently less concerned with raising tax revenue than Congress. In this case Gov-
ernment may be willing to accept the reduction in tax revenue collected from firms 
that result from a VA if firms agree to a higher environmental goal than would result 
from the traditional policy process. 
 
δc 
λc 
λg 
δg 
 
δc 
λc 
λg 
δg 
VA-set border
*R R
*R R
ISO-  curvesR
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Model Predictions 
Of specific interest in relation to the following empirical analysis is the situation 
where the traditional policy alternative is expected to result in non-revenue raising 
regulation. Then the VA-set becomes a vertical line (figure 1b), i.e. becomes inde-
pendent of the λ since T*= 0. When VAs reduce efficiency (the situation illustrated 
in figure 1b) Governments that are more concerned with the environment will no 
longer be able to induce firms to attain higher environmental goals than under the 
traditional process because there is no credible threat of tax payment. Thus if  the 
policy disagreement explanation applies (and many VAs are inefficient) only Gov-
ernments that are less concerned with the environment than Congress will find VAs 
advantageous since VAs will achieve lower environmental goals than the traditional 
alternative. If on the other hand VAs generally improve efficiency (corresponding to 
the VA-set border moving to the right in figure 1b) it becomes possible for VAs to 
increase environmental performance relative to traditional regulation (because of the 
efficiency gain) and we would expect Governments that are less as well as more 
concerned with the environment than Congress to find VAs advantageous. 
Irrespective of the VA's relative efficiency, the model implies that environmental 
performance increases relative to traditional regulation as Government's concern 
with the environment increases relative to Congress (corresponding to a move to a 
point in the figure with a higher δ-value and so to a higher R -isoquant).  
4. EXTENDING THE MODEL WITH FIRM IO SIGNALLING POWER 
This augmentation of the model attempts to capture the responsibility shifting expla-
nation suggested in the introduction. Presumably interest groups have the ability to 
do quiet lobbying under the traditional process as well as under the VA process. 
However, interest groups often participate in the public debate as well in order to 
sway public opinion in their favour thus putting indirect pressure on policy makers. 
The shift in responsibility that VAs cause may be important with respect to this part 
of the interest group's activity. It will probably reduce the effectiveness of an interest 
group's public criticism of Government, if Government is not perceived as responsi-
ble for the criticized act or if the interest group is perceived as sharing responsibility 
for the criticized act. 
We will present the augmented model formally, but only give an intuitive expla-
nation of the model results (the reader interested in the formal model derivation is 
referred to Hansen 1999). 
In the augmented model it is assumed that interest groups may affect public 
opinion by signalling the utility affect that policy has on their constituents. If the 
signal is credible the public may punish/reward those perceived as responsible (e.g. 
through the ballot box or through consumer demand decisions).  If the interest group 
is powerful (i.e. the public reacts to the signal that is sent by the interest group) this 
will affect the result of the traditional policy process by making it less attractive for 
Congress and Government to reduce the powerful interest group's utility. 
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Now consider the utility functions when the firm IO has signalling power under 
the traditional policy process. The IO is able to signal the utility effect of policy on 
firms to the public who in turn may punish Government and Congress that are re-
sponsible for policy, e.g. at the next election. The risk of punishment is assumed to 
be proportional to the utility effect signalled by the IO. Augmenting the previous 
model in this way we have the following agent utilities under the traditional policy 
process: 
 
* * f ** *
c f c c f =  +  +   + U U s UT R   (9) 
 
* * f ** *
g f g g f =  +  +  + U U s UT R   (10) 
 
* * * *
f  = -  - C( ,  )U T R T  (11) 
where
f
s is the marginal utility effects of firm interest group criticism. 
When responsibility for setting the environmental goal is shared with the IO 
through a voluntary agreement, it is no longer possible for the IO to credibly criti-
cize policy and so agent utilities under the voluntary agreement process are as in the 
previous subsection: 
 f
 = - C(cR, 0) U
 (12) 
 
cc f =  + RU U   (13) 
 
gg f =  + RU U   (14) 
In the model the effect of interest group signalling on Government and Congress 
utility is assumed to be the same so that only the policy priority weights can differ 
between the two utility functions. This means that the effect of signalling on the 
VA-set can be illustrated in the same type of diagram as in figure 1. The result of 
firm signalling power is that the VA-set moves up in the graph as shown in figure 2. 
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a. Revenue raising alternative b. Non-revenue raising alternative 
FIGURE 2 Illustration of the VA-set for a model with interest group signalling power 
The intuition is that when the firm IO has signalling power, it will criticize policy 
under the traditional process thus reducing Government utility. When responsibility 
for setting the environmental goal is shared with the IO through a voluntary agree-
ment, it is no longer possible for the IO to credibly criticize policy. This gives an 
extra benefit to Government of entering into a VA vis-à-vis the situation without 
firm IO signalling power so that for all parameter sets the VA becomes more attrac-
tive (the outward shift of the border in figure 2a). At the same time firm bargaining 
power increases so that the resulting VA will have lower environmental perfor-
mance than if the firm did not have signalling power (we see that isoquants and thus 
the area of reduced environmental performance also shift out in figure 2a). If the 
benefit of eliminating firm IO criticism is large enough it will make VAs that in-
crease implementation costs attractive to Government even though there is no disa-
greement with Congress policy priorities. The utility benefit of eliminating firm IO 
criticism may be greater than the utility loss from increased implementation costs. 
Model Predictions 
When the traditional policy alternative is expected to result in non-revenue raising 
regulation (figure 1b) firm signalling power will also result in an outward shift of the 
vertical VA-set border and the underlying R -isoquants. Thus as in the previous 
section the model implies that efficiency reducing VAs will lower environmental 
performance relative to traditional non-revenue alternatives (because Government 
does not have a credible threat of tax payment as an inducement). However, even 
δc 
λg 
λc 
δg 
IG power No IG power 
 
No IG power 
λc 
IG power 
δg δc 
λg 
*R R
*R R
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though environmental performance af the VA falls further as IO signalling power 
increases (because of increasing IO bargaining power) it may become advantageous 
even for Governments that are more concerned with the environment than Congress 
to choose the VA process. Governments that are more concerned with the environ-
ment may be willing to accept a lower environmental target than under traditional 
regulation in order to avoid harmful IO criticism. 
Irrespective of the VA's relative efficiency and IO signalling power, the model 
still implies that environmental performance increases relative to traditional regula-
tion as Government's concern with the environment increases relative to Congress 
(corresponding to a move to a point in the figure with a higher δ-value and so to a 
higher R -isoquant).  
5. EXTENDING THE SIMPLE MODEL WITH ENVIRONMENTAL INTEREST 
GROUP SIGNALLING POWER 
Now consider environmental interest group signalling power, but in a model allow-
ing  responsibility for goal setting to be decoupled from responsibility for policy 
implementation. Let Rg denote the goal set at the time of policy implementation and 
R the damage reduction actually attained. The environmental interest group can crit-
icize goal setting as well as goal attainment and we assume that non-attainment of a 
set goal in itself increases the risk of punishment. The following simple specification 
catches this. At the time of goal setting the utility effect of criticism is: 
 g
s(  - R )R  
where R  is the level of emission perceived by the public as acceptable. At the time 
of goal attainment the utility effect of criticism is: 
 g
2s(R - )R  
so that non-attainment of a set goal is costly, while the net effect of criticism of goal 
setting and goal attainment when goals are reached is that the actually attained emis-
sion reduction is criticized (the net effect is s(R - R)). 
Agent utilities under the traditional policy process become: 
 
* * * *
f  = -  - C( , )U T R T  (15) 
 
* * e* * *
c f c c =  +  +  + (  - R)U U sT R R   (16) 
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* * e* * *
g f g g =  +  +  + (  - R )U U sT R R   (17) 
where
e
s is the marginal utility effects of environmental interest group criticism  on 
Congress and Government. Under the traditional process set goals are attained in 
order to avoid the extra criticism of goal non-attainment. 
Under the voluntary agreement process the Congress has no responsibility. Govern-
ment shares responsibility for goal formulation with the firm, while implementation 
is the sole responsibility of the firm. We then have 
 
e e
f f gf  = -C(cR, 0) + (R - R) + 2 (R - )s sU R  (18) 
 
cc f =  + RU U   (19) 
 
e
g gg f =  + R + (  - R)sU U R  (20) 
where
e
fs is the marginal utility effects of environmental interest group criticism on 
the firm. 
Although the intuition is somewhat different, the result of environmental interest 
group signalling power is that if 
e e
f  < s s the VA-set moves up in the graph just as  
shown in figure 2a. 
The intuition is that when the environmental interest group has signalling power, 
it will criticize policy (goal setting and goal attainment) under the traditional process 
thus reducing Government utility in proportion to the actual emission reduction 
achieved. When responsibility for attaining the goal is shifted to the firm IO through 
a voluntary agreement, Government is no longer susceptible to criticism of goal at-
tainment. If Government can persuade the firm IO to set high goals then the VA 
entails an extra utility benefit for Government even though the higher goals are not 
met since Government is not responsible for goal attainment. However, the firm IO 
must be willing to accept responsibility and the utility loss associated with environ-
mental interest group criticism of non-attainment of the set goal. Thus only if firms 
are less sensitive to environmental interest group criticism than Government 
(
e e
f  < s s ) will there be potential gains from trading responsibility for reduced tax 
payment and reduced realised emission reductions.  If 
e e
f  < s s this gives an extra 
benefit of entering into a VA which, like in the case of firm IO signalling, makes 
VAs more attractive to Government. If the benefits of trading responsibility are 
large enough it will make VAs that increase implementation costs attractive to Gov-
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ernment even though there is no disagreement with Congress policy priorities. Actu-
al emission reductions may be lower or higher than under traditional regulation, but 
in all cases goals are set higher than attained emission reductions (i.e. we will al-
ways have gR R ). It is important to stress that this non-attainment of the set goal 
is an implicit part of the agreement with Government. 
Model Predictions 
When non-revenue raising traditional policy alternatives expected the situation can 
parallel to above be illustrated by figure 2b. EG-signalling power will just as IO-
signalling power cause an outward shift of the vertical VA-set border and the under-
lying R -isoquants. Efficiency reducing VAs will also in this case lower environ-
mental performance relative to traditional non-revenue alternatives (because of 
Government's lack of a credible tax alternative). In this case, however, environmen-
tal performance af the VA falls as EG-signalling power increases because this in-
creases the IO's bargaining power (i.e. it increases the value of the asset supplied by 
the IO: taking responsibility). Despite this it may become advantageous for envi-
ronment biassed Governments to choose the VAs and accept lower environmental 
performance in order to reduce the effect of harmful EG-criticism by shifting re-
sponsibility to the IO. 
Essentially then the model predicts that EG-signalling power has the same effect 
on the propensity to enter VAs and on the resulting environmental performance as 
IO-signalling power and that this effect is stronger the less susceptible firms are to 
public criticism from the EG. The key difference is the mechanism of responsibility 
transfer which in this case is through (planned) non-attainment of the environmental 
goals set in the agreement. Thus the model would predict increasing non-attainment 
of goals as EG-signalling strength increases (while this would not be expected if the 
agreement were driven by IO signalling strength). 
Finally, we again note that irrespective of the VA's relative efficiency and EG-
signalling power, the model implies that environmental performance increases rela-
tive to traditional regulation as Government's concern with the environment increas-
es relative to Congress (corresponding to a move to a point in the figure with a high-
er δ-value and so to a higher R -isoquant).  
6. THE META STUDY 
The idea behind conducting a meta study was to utilize the knowledge gathered by 
researchers through case studies on about specific voluntary agreements. Our hope 
was to generate a sufficient number of observations of combinations of key model 
variables from studied VAs to allow testing of model predictions. 
The meta study (see Chidiak et al. (1999) for details) was conducted by tele-
phone interviewing researchers who have published case studies of voluntary 
agreements with industrial organizations. A questionnaire with multiple choice ques-
tions was used as an interview guide. Choices among the listed answers were elicit-
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ed and explanatory comments noted by the interviewers. Researchers and case stud-
ies were located through the so-called snowball method (starting with case studies 
we were aware of, each researcher was asked if he/she had knowledge of other VA 
case studies). 
The questionnaires covered most key variables of the model presented in the 
previous section (in addition to questions on information and cost structure and on 
implementation of the VA). In order to avoid arbitrary reference standards where 
possible, questions elicited rankings rather than ordinal evaluations. The question-
naire is reproduced in Chidiak et al. (1999), while the analysed VAs along with a list 
of interviewed researchers and referenced case studies are listed in appendix 1. 
All in all 20 interviews were completed of which 19 turned out to be on VAs 
with industrial organizations. The number of answers to specific questions was in 
many cases reduced further since researchers were often unable to give qualified 
answers to all questions. 
In the next subsection we present descriptive statistics for variables generated 
from answers to those questions that are relevant for testing model predictions (ta-
bles indicate the source question from which the variable is derived and where this is 
not apparent how the variable is derived). In the following subsection we formulate 
and attempt to test model predictions in terms of correlation patterns between these 
variables. 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Initially we elicited the researcher's evaluation of the type of traditional regulation 
that would have been implemented without the VA and the credibility of this threat. 
In table 1 the background threat for the VA is summarised for the 19 relevant cases. 
 
TABLE 1. Strength and type of alternative policy if VA had failed 
Regulatory threat Number of cases 
Tax: 1 
Direct regulation: 9 
Clear that traditional regulation would have been 
implemented, but unclear which type: 3 
Unclear whether traditional regulation would 
have been implemented :  3 
No response: 3 
 
It is notable that in most cases there was a clear threat of traditional regulation if the 
VA failed which suggests that the VAs probably have affected firm behaviour. It is 
also notable that the regulatory threat in most cases is direct regulation, i.e. non-
revenue raising regulation. Thus our data should be interpreted using the model with 
a non-revenue raising traditional policy threat. 
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Then we asked the researcher for his opinion of Government's environmental 
and firm bias relative to opposition parties. In table 2 Government bias variables are 
summarised. 
TABLE 2. Government bias relative to opposition parties 
 Biassed 
against 
No bias Biassed 
in favour 
of 
No  
response 
Gov. bias vis-à-
vis firms 
(MGFB):  5 6 5 3 
Gov. bias vis-à-
vis environment 
(MGEB):  5 11 2 1 
 
These questions try to get at the model bias parameters (δg, λg) and  (δc , λc ). There 
seems not to be any dominating bias pattern for the sampled VAs. However, it is 
notable that the variables are highly (negatively) correlated, i.e. governments that are 
biassed in favour of firms also tend to be biassed against the environment. 
We also elicited the researcher's opinion of interest group signalling strength and 
firms' concern with their environmental image. In table 3 these variables are summa-
rised. 
TABLE 3. Interest group signalling power 
 Below 
average 
Average Above  
average 
No  
response 
IO signalling 
power (MIOS): 2 5 12 0 
EG signalling 
power (MEGS): 5 3 11 0 
Firms' concern 
with environmen-
tal image (FIMI): 3 4 9 3 
 
There seems to be a tendency for EGs and IOs in the sample to have above average 
signalling strength and for the sampled VA firms to be more concerned with their 
environmental image than other firms. 
In table 4 the researchers' opinion of whether EG and opposition parties approve of 
the use of a VA is summarised. 
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TABLE 4. Approval of the VA instrument 
 Disapprove Non-
committed 
Approve No 
 response 
EG approval of the use 
of the VA instrument 
(EGVA):  9 8  2 
Opposition approval of 
the use of the VA in-
strument (OPVANY):  3 7 6 3 
 
We note that while EGs are critical of the use of VAs in a majority of cases opposi-
tion parties are only critical in one out of five cases. 
Finally, the interviewed researchers found that EGs generally are more critical of 
the use of VAs as the way to reach environmental goals than they were of the actual 
goals set in the studied VAs. We interpret this difference as a lack of confidence in 
the VA's ability to actually reach the goals set in the agreement. In table 5 we tabu-
late the variable 'EG goal confidence' constructed in the following way: If the EG 
has a better valuation of the VA goal than of the VA instrument the EG is placed in 
the 'Not Confident' category. If the EG has a lower evaluation of the goal than of the 
VA instrument than the EG is placed in the 'Confident' category. If the EG has the 
same evaluation of the goal as of the VA instrument then the EG is placed in the 
'Non-committed' category. 
TABLE 5. EG goal confidence 
 Not  
Confident 
Non-
committed 
Confident No 
response 
EG goal confidence 
(DVAGO):  4 12 1 2 
 
Table 5 indicates a tendency for EGs not to be confident in the VA's ability to reach 
the goals set in the agreement. 
6.2 Test of Model Predictions 
We see from table 1 that the traditional policy threat was non-revenue raising regu-
lation in almost all cases covered by the meta-study. In table 6 we summarize the 
empirical findings that the theoretical model predicts for the situation with non-
revenue raising regulatory threats. In the first four rows the predicted findings (de-
rived in sections 3, 4 and 5 in terms of questionnaire variable correlation patterns 
etc.) are summarised for each of the different VA-explanations allowed for by the 
model, i.e.: 
 the efficiency explanation 
 the disagreement explanation 
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 the responsibility shifting explanation driven by IO signalling power and 
 the responsibility shifting explanation driven by EG signalling power 
 
In the last row we present the actual correlation patterns etc. found in the data. 
Columns 1 and 2: The key prediction for the disagreement explanation ( i.e. that 
VAs are inefficient and driven by disagreement over policy priorities between Gov-
ernment and Congress) presented in section 3 was that we would only expect firm 
biassed governments to enter VAs and that we would expect Congress to be opposed 
to the use of VAs. This pattern is not expected if any of the other three explanations 
apply. We do not find this pattern in our data. 
Column 3: If VAs are explained by IO signalling power (i.e. that VAs are ineffi-
cient and driven by Government's desire to avoid being publicly criticized by power-
ful IOs) we would expect EG approval of the use of VAs (variable EGVA) to be 
negatively correlated with firm IO signalling power (variable MIOS). The reason 
being (as shown in section 4) that environmental performance falls as IO signalling 
strength increases. If VAs are not explained by firm signalling we would on the oth-
er hand not expect EG approval to be correlated with IO signalling power. There is 
no such correlation pattern in our data, rather there is a small highly insignificant 
positive correlation coefficient. 
Column 4: If on the other hand VAs are explained by EG signalling power (i.e. 
that VAs are inefficient and driven by the Government's desire to avoid being pub-
licly criticized by powerful EGs) we would expect EG approval of VAs (variable 
EGVA) to be negatively correlated with EG signalling power (variable MEGS) in-
stead. In this case (as shown in section 5) environmental performance falls as EG 
signalling power (and thereby IO bargaining strength) increases. We do in fact find a 
highly significant negative correlation coefficient in our data.  
Column 5 and 6: Further, if VAs are explained by EG signalling power 
‘planned’ non-attainment of environmental goals increases with EG signalling pow-
er but falls with the firms' concern with their environmental image. With this expla-
nation we would therefore also expect EG goal confidence (variable DVAGO) to be 
negatively correlated with EG signalling power (variable MEGS) and positively 
correlated with the firms' concern with their environmental image (variable FIMI). 
Though the coefficients are not significant at the 5% level we also find this pattern 
in our data. 
Column 5  and 6: Finally, for all four explanations generated by the model (in-
cluding the efficiency explanation) we expect EG approval of VAs (variable EGVA) 
to be positively correlated with government environmental bias (variable MGEB) as 
well as with the firms' concern with their environmental image (variable FIMI) since 
this in all cases increases environmental performance. We find a significant positive 
correlation coefficient for EGVA*MGEB in our data while the corresponding coef-
ficient for EGVA*FIMI is highly insignificant.  
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TABLE 6. Model predictions and meta study results 
 
Dominating 
Government 
bias pattern 
Dominating 
Government-
Congress  
agreement 
pattern on use 
of Vas 
EGVA-MIOS 
correlation 
EGVA-MEGS 
correlation 
DVAGO-
MEGS corre-
lation 
DVAGO-FIMI 
correlation 
EGVA-MGEB 
correlation 
EGVA-FIMI 
correlation 
Model predictions with:         
Efficiency explanation: none None none none none none positive positive 
Disagreement explanation: biassed in 
favour of 
firms 
Government-
Congress dis-
agreement none none none none positive positive 
Responsibility shifting ex-
planation (driven by IO sig-
nalling power): none none negative none none none positive positive 
Responsibility shifting ex-
planation (driven by EG sig-
nalling power): none none none negative negative positive positive positive 
Meta study:          
Findings: none none none negative** (negative) (positive) positive* none 
Spearman's rho:    0.170 -0.862** -0.368 +0.309 +0.603* +0.097 
(significance level)   (0.513) (0.000) (0.146) (0.283) (0.013) (0.741) 
* significant at 5% level. 
**  significant at 1% level. 
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In conclusion no correlations of unexpected signs were found and of the two correla-
tions that were predicted by the model regardless of VA explanation one was found. 
Given the small number of cases not finding all the predicted correlations is not sur-
prising. On the other hand, it is also clear that applicability of the model has not 
been tested vigorously. 
Taking the model for granted we do not find the variable patterns that would be 
generated if the policy disagreement explanation or the IO signalling explanation 
dominated in the studied cases. Given the small number of cases studied this should 
not in itself be be over interpreted. However the pattern expected if the EG signal-
ling explanation applied is seen in the meta study data though it is not significant for 
all variables. Finding such a pattern even though the number of cases is small is an 
indication that the EG signalling explanation may apply in many of the cases stud-
ied. 
Thus, if we take the model for granted our data suggests that EG signalling may 
explain the use of VAs in many sample cases. The model predicts that VAs in these 
cases are less efficient than the traditional alternative regulation that would have 
been adopted without the VA. Further, the model predicts that VAs in these cases 
achieve a lower environmental performance than the traditional alternative would 
have achieved which may reduce social welfare further. 
When interpreting this study it should, however, be stressed that we can not ex-
pect the studied sample of VAs to be representative af all VAs (in fact the way re-
searchers select VAs to be studied is probably far from generating a random selec-
tion as is the way we have located the subset of case studies included in the meta 
study). 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The study reveals that in most of the analysed cases VAs were backed by a clear 
threat of regulatory action if the VA failed. Thus we expect that most of the VAs 
covered in the study have been able to induce changes in firm behaviour. The focus 
of the study has been whether the VA is more or less cost effective than the tradi-
tional regulatory alternative. 
We have presented a theoretical model offering several explanations of VAs and 
confronted it with empirical evidence from case studies of voluntary agreements. 
The empirical evidence does not falsify the model, however, the study only co-
vers a small number of cases and testing is only attempted in a few dimensions. 
Thus even though the results are mildly encouraging with regard to the model's ex-
planatory power, the theoretical model is by no means tested vigorously. Further 
generalisation beyond the specific sample of VA's studied is not possible because of 
representativity problems. 
If the theoretical model is taken for granted, the data tends to support the hypoth-
eses that Governments in many of the sample cases choose VAs in order to shift the 
responsibility for implementation to industrial organizations that are less sensitive to 
criticism from powerful environmental interest groups. When this explanation of a 
VA applies, the model predicts that the VA will be less cost effective and achieve 
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lower environmental performance than the traditional regulatory alternative which 
would otherwise have been adopted. 
Although the presented findings are not conclusive, nor necessarily representa-
tive, they do suggest the worrying possibility that some - possibly many - of the VAs 
being established today achieve lower environmental performance less cost effec-
tively than the most likely traditional regulatory alternative. 
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APPENDIX 
VAs COVERED IN THE META STUDY SAMPLE 
The meta study was conducted by telephone interviewing researchers who have pub-
lished case studies of negotiated voluntary agreements. A questionnaire with multi-
ple choice questions was used as an interview guide. Choices among the listed an-
swers were elicited and explanatory comments noted by the interviewers. Research-
ers and case studies were located through the so-called snowball method (each re-
searcher was asked if he/she had knowledge of other VA case studies). 20 interviews 
were completed of which 19 were negotiated VAs. Coverage of the studied cases is 
illustrated in Table 1, while the VAs in the sample are listed in Table 2. Finally, the 
full list of researchers and the case study references are listed at the end of the ap-
pendix. 
TABLE 1. Countries and environmental areas covered by the VAs of the study 
 Air Water Waste All 
Finland 1    
Norway 1    
Denmark 2    
Holland 2  2 2 
Belgium 1  1  
Germany  1 2  
France  1 2  
Italy 1    
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TABLE 2. VAs in the meta study sample 
Belgian VA for SO2 and NOx emissions from Electricity Suppliers (1991) 
Belgian Convention with the Cement Industry for waste treatment (1995) 
Finnish Agreement on energy conservation with the paper sector 
Danish VA with the plastics industry over PVC use 
Danish VA with the electric utilities over SO2/NOx (1996) 
Dutch Packaging Covenant (1997 version) 
Dutch Covenant with the Chemical Industry (all environmental concerns) 
Dutch VA with spray can producers (on CFC use in spray cans) 
Dutch packaging covenant (1991 version) 
Dutch VA with the Basic Metal Industry (on all environmental issues) 
Dutch LTA (on energy efficiency) with the Chemical Industry 
French VA on Packaging waste recycling: ECO-EMBALLAGES (1992) 
French VA on soaps and detergents (over phosphates) (1986-89-90) 
French VA on end-of-life vehicle recycling/reuse (1993) 
German VA on Packaging waste recycling: DSD (1991) 
German VA on end-of-life vehicles (recycling) (1996) 
German VA on EDTA (Chemical gelatine agent) (1991) 
Italian VAs on the quality of fuels (1989-92) 
Norwegian VA on GHG emissions with the aluminium industry 
(The interviewed researchers were:1) Franck Aggeri, CGS, Ecole des Mines de Paris, Paris, 
France, 2) Steven Baeke, University of Ghent, Belgium,3) Peter Börkey, CERNA, Ecole des 
Mines de Paris, Paris, France, 4) Karl Brockmann, Centre for European Economic Research, 
Mannheim, Germany, 5) Jacco Farla, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, 6) Matthieu 
Glachant, CERNA, Ecole des Mines de Paris, Paris, France, 7) Verina Ingram, University of 
Wageningen and IWACO,  The Netherlands, 8) Katja Johannsen, AKF, Denmark, 9) Ralph 
Jülich, Öko Institute, Darmstadt, Germany, 10) Signe Krarup, AKF, Denmark, 11) Delphine 
Misonne, CEDRE, Bruxelles – Belgium, 12) Giulia Pesaro, IEFE, U. Bocconi, Milan, Italy, 
13) Philippe Quirion, CERNA, Ecole des Mines de Paris, Paris, France, 14) Mikael Togeby, 
AKF, Denmark, 15) Asbjørn Torvanger, Center for International Climate and Environmental 
Research, Oslo, Norway) 
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